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* STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Does the law of Utah recognize that under certain

circumstances a contract for employment, of indefinite duration
will give rise to implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing.
2.

Is the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (inherent

in other contracts under Utah law) inherent in an at-will employeremployee relationship where a policy and procedure manual exists.
3.

Does a policy and procedure manual governing employer and

employee relationships create an express or implied contract of
employment such as to create a cause of action should the terms
of the manual not be followed;
4.

Does the defense of qualified privilege exist under

the facts and circumstances of this case so as to justify dismissal
of a defamation claim.
5.

Did the District Court err in partially dismissing

plaintiffs1 claim for breach of contract and in dismissing
plaintiffs1 claim for defamation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of a jury verdict awarding monetary damages

for plaintiffs and against defendant Nordstrom.

A cross appeal

was also filed by plaintiffs from the partial dismissal by the
trial court of their breach of contract claims and the dismissal
of their defamation claims.
-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

II.

DISPOSITION BY THE LOWER COURT
Following a jury trial held from January 14 through January

30, 198 5, the jury awarded judgment on special interrogatories
in favor of the plaintiff Dennis Knapp in the sum of $150,000, in
favor of the plaintiff Barbara Knapp in the sum of $80,000 and in
favor of the plaintiff Cathy Brehany in the sum of $50,000.
R. C82-5828, 538.

At the conclusion of the case and prior to its

submission to the jury, the district court dismissed plaintiffs1
cause of action claiming defamation and partially dismissed plaintiffs1
cause of action claiming breach of contract.

T. 2319-2321.

The

district court subsequently denied defendant's Motion for Summary

*

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, New Trial or Remittitur.
T. 2467-68.

This appeal and cross appeal followed.

R. 82-5828

2475-76, 2478-79.
III.

<

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiffs Dennis Knapp, Barbara Knapp and Cathy Brehany

were employees of defendant at its Crossroad Plaza Store in Salt
Lake City, Utah.
July 1973.

(

Dennis Knapp had been employed by defendant since

T. 954.

Barbara Knapp had been employed by defendant

since October 1975 and Cathy Brehany was employed by Nordstrom
but the exact date is unclear from the record.

(

T. 1152-53.

At the time each of the plaintiffs was hired each was given
and required to sign a Manual entitled Nordstrom History, Policy
and Regulations.

(Ex.P-1) T. 957-959, T. 1153, 1274-1275.

|

The

manual provides for a set of rules and describes the conduct expected
of employees.

It provided for a procedure for termination of

employees and stated in part:
-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

|

"The following offenses may result in immediate dismissal:
5. Unbecoming conduct bringing reflection or criticism
upon the store and its personnel, malicious mischief, neglect
or carelessness resulting in injury to individuals or destruction
of store or other property.
8. Introduction, possession, or use of habit forming drugs,
hallucinogens, illegal narcotics or intoxicating liquors on the
property of the store or reporting for duty under the influence
of same. This includes use or consumption during breaks, lunch
period or prior to reporting for work."
A total of eleven grounds are stated as offenses which may
result in immediate termination,

pp. 23-24 of Ex.P-1.

Ex.P-1 further provides:
"REGULATIONS PROTECTING YOU AND YOUR STORE" (Emphasis Added)
"In organizations of our size, there must be rules to maintain
harmony and prevent injustice. (Emphasis Added) Nordstrom has as
few rules as possible, but they are strictly enforced in fairness
to the group as a whole.
The following may result in discharge after a written warning..."
Nine categories of offenses are then listed.
1981 defendant

On July 21,

terminated the employment of all three plaintiffs.

Plaintiff Dennis Knapp was fired for using drugs.

T. 999-1000.

Plaintiff Barbara Knapp was fired because she was the wife of
Dennis Knapp.

T. 1298, 1300.

drugs to employees.

Cathy Brehany was fired for supplying

T. 1143.

After the firing of plaintiffs, agents of defendants advised
others who asked what they should tell other employees about the
termination, to tell them the plaintiffs were fired because they
were involved in drugs or narcotics.

T. 1140, 1331, 1337, 1338, 1353,

1360, 1367, 1372-77, 1392-99, 1403-07.
The defendant claims that the events leading up to the
termination of plaintiffs began with an internal investigation.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In fact, no real investigation was done.

The defendant's agents

relied upon rumor, innuendo, hearsay and speculation in terminating
the plaintiffs. T. 1560-68.
Of particular import is Mary Tasa's description of the birthday party at Michael Soul's home where drugs were allegedly used.
Tasa never stated that either Dennis, Barbara or Cathy were present.
T. 1565.

In fact, there was testimony that none of the plaintiffs

in fact attended that party.

T. 945-48, 1327-33.

Counsel for defendant-appellant on page 6-9 refers this court
to many transcript citations in an effort to show the careful
investigation conducted by defendant's agents and offices.

Plaintiffs-

respondents adopt these citations as evidence that the investigation
was one of rumor, hearsay, innuendo and suspicion.

In fact, a

careful review of all the evidence offered at trial shows that no
real investigation into the allegations involving the plaintiffs
was ever made by anyone on behalf of the defendant.
i

The jury heard all of the evidence and under the instructions
given to it by the court and using the special interrogatories
form of verdict submitted to it concluded that the defendant did
<

not act in good faith in terminating the employment of plaintiffs.
C-82-5828, 538.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

i
1.

This case should be affirmed insofar as the jury verdict

awarding plaintiffs damages for breach of an implied covenent of
good faith and fair dealing.

The court should follow the majority
4

of cases which have accepted the doctrine of good faith and fair
dealing as a contractual obligation growing out of the contract
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
4 -contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,-may

especially where as here there is a policy and procedure manual
dictating the rights of the parties.
(a)

The evidence was sufficient to justify the verdict;

(b)

The issue of breach of implied warranty was properly

(c)

The jury instructions given were proper;

(d)

Bad faith was adequately defined in the jury instructions;

(e)

No remittitur should be granted.

raised;

2.

That portion of the district court's judgment partially

dismissing plaintiffs1 claimed breach of contract should be reviewed
and the case remanded for a new trial since an express or implied
contract existed by virtue of the policy and procedure manual signed
on behalf of each plaintiff.
3.

That portion of the district court's judgment dismissing

plaintiffs' claim for defamation should be reversed and the case
remanded for trial since a qualified privilege did not exist
under the circumstances of this case.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE UTAH SUPREME COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE JURY VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFFS AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
The judgment of the jury in favor of plaintiffs is not in
error and should be affirmed.

Plaintiffs were not at-will employees

of Nordstrom, such that they could be fired for any reason.

Utah

law should recognize a claim for breach of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.

There was adequate evidence to

substantiate and justify the jury verdict.

A claim for relief for

breach of an implied convenant of good faith and fair dealing was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
-5-J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

pled and properly presented to the jury.
A.

The Circumstances Surrounding Plaintiffs1 Employment and
The Method Employed By Defendant In Firing Them Created
A Cause Of Action Under Which Plaintiffs Are Entitled
To Recover Damages.

The Supreme Court of Utah has never decided a case directly
on point with the case at bar.

A careful analysis of the two leading

Utah cases in this area leads to the conclusion that Utah does
recognize that under certain circumstances, a contract for employment,
of indefinite duration, will give rise to implied covenants to not
discharge except for cause and in good faith.
In Bihlmaier v. Carson, 603 P. 2d 790 (Utah 1979) the plaintiff
sued for breach of an oral employment contract with defendant, who
founded and operated a small grocery store.

Carson, because of his

age and desire to spend more leisure time, sought a qualified person
to become acting manager of his store.

Plaintiff and defendant

engaged in "extended negotiations" before plaintiff left his previous
job in California to take the managerial position.
In was undisputed in Bihlmaier that the employment was being
conducted on a trial basis only, and that plaintiff's continued
employment and assumption of complete managerial duties was conditional upon the plaintiff's performance during a "trial period".
Shortly after arriving in Utah, and starting his employment,
plaintiff Bihlmaier sought a loan to buy a house.

The loan was

refused because the employer answered a question on the loan application
form, as to the probability of plaintiff's continued employment as
follows:

"continued employment depends upon applicant hired on

i
a trial basis only."

j..-.
- 6 -

•
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The plaintiff considered this to be a constructive discharge
and a breach of the oral employment contract, and thereafter
plaintiff terminated his employment and brought suit.
The Supreme Court affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the
defendant employer, noting:
"Under the facts as presented in the depositions of the
two parties, the final oral employment contract contained no express terms concerning the duration of the
plaintiff's employment. Rather, the evidence indicates
that both parties intended the employment to be
indefinite and terminable at the will of either party.
The plaintiff explained in his deposition:
Q. Was there any agreement as to how long you
would be employed with Mr. Carson?
A. Other than I was hired as a store manager, no,
no specific time.
Q. There was no specific time at all, was there?
A. No. That is correct.
***

Q.

A.

So you did understand and agree that your
employment was for no definite period of
time and might be terminated at any time
without previous notice. Isn't that right?
Yes, I think that's fair, ...

The general rule concerning personal employment contracts
is, in the absence of some further express or implied
stipulation as to the duration of the employment or of
a good consideration in addition to the services contracted
to be rendered, the contract is no more than an indefinite
general hiring which is terminable at the will of either
party. The evidence presented in support of the summary
judgment motion shows this was the express intent and
understanding of the contracting parties." (603 P. 2d at
792, emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the emphasized portion of the opinion quoted
above that this court specifically recognized that if there is an
express or implied stipulation as to the duration of the employment
then the contract is not terminable at will.

Clearly the evidence

in Bihlmaier was that the contract could be terminated anytime.
Yet, the court in its decision does not confine itself to these
facts but observed that if there is an express or implied stipulation
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as to duration then termination at will does not apply.
In Piacitelli v. Southern Utah State College, 636 P. 2d
1063 (Utah 1981), the plaintiff had been employed by the defendant
College since 1973, as Coordinator of Counselling.
was "classified staff"

His position

non-faculty, and not eligible for tenure.

Every academic year from 1973 to 1978, he was issued a Notice of
Appointment, signed by the college president, and "effective for the
contract period of July 1 through June 30".
his job title, salary, and department.

This Notice set forth

Each year, he would sign

and return a form indicating his acceptance of employment as specified
in the Notice.
Early on in his employment, the plaintiff had numerous disputes
with his supervisors.

Some of these were never resolved.

In December

of 19 78, plaintiff's immediate supervisor recommended that the college
not continue to employ plaintiff.
The college president sent plaintiff a one sentence letter
dated January 24, 1979, indicating his contract would "not be
renewed at the end of the contract period."

Plaintiff was later

advised by a second letter from the president dated February 13,
1979 that the college's action was "not to be interpreted as dismissal

'

for cause" which action if taken, would result in immediate termination
of employment.

A later affidavit from the dean of students indicated

non-renewal, rather than dismissal for cause, was used "out of

*

consideration for [plaintiff's] professional future and in accordance
with higher education practices."
The plaintiff sued, alleging the failure to renew the employment
contract was, in effect, a dismissal for cause, and violated his
-8-
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I

due process rights, as set out by the SUSC Personnel Policies
and Procedures,

Plaintiff argued that the collegefs Personnel

Policies and Procedures Manual (hereinafter manual) controlled
the case.
The manual suggested that classified employees were either
probationary, hence "terminable at will" or permanent, hence
"terminable only after compliance with specified procedures."
Plaintiff argued the college' s action of not renewing his contract
was an attempt to avoid its own procedures, and do indirectly what
its own manual would not allow directly.
The college agreed that plaintiff was not probationary, but
contended that since he was employed on a year to year basis, and
his contract had expired by its own terms, he was not dismissed at
all, rather, he was merely not rehired.
procedures did not apply.

Therefore, the termination

The Supreme Court noted:

"In January, 19 80, the district court ruled that the
college's Personnel Manual governed the terms of
Piacitelli's employment contract with the college,
that Piacitelli had acquired fpermanent employment
status1 under that contract, and that the college's
failure to renew Piacitelli's annual employment
contract without complying 'with due process of law
requirements pursuant to [the Personnel Manual]...
constituted plaintiff's termination and thus a breach
of contract.' The district court thereupon ordered
the college to grant Piacitelli 'administrative due
process procedure pursuant to the [Personnel Manual]'.
This was a final order, which, unless reversed on
appeal, is res judicata and binding upon these parties.
****

The order was not appealed. Consequently, for purposes
of this case, we must treat Piacitelli as an employee
with permanent employment status whose employment
contract entitled him to the formal procedures specified
in the Personnel Manual before he could be dismissed or
terminated, even at the conclusion of the annual contract
period." (636 P. 2d at 1065, citations omitted.)
-9-
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Thereafter, the college issued a formal notice of dismissal.
The plaintiff appealed through three separate levels of college
authorities.

All upheld the dismissal.

The plaintiff then returned

to the district court, which ruled that the college had substantially
complied with its procedures, and that the termination was sound,
and that no grounds existed to reinstate plaintiff.

Plaintiff was

awarded back pay for the period from when his contract expired until
the proper termination was effected.
The plaintiff's sole issue on appeal was that the college
had not adequately complied with the contractual termination procedures contained in the manual.

The Supreme Court held that the

college had substantially complied with the procedures, and substantial
compliance was sufficient, because this satisfied the substantial
interests of the parties, so that the employment contract was not
breached.
The college had cross-appealed the award of back pay, presenting the issue,
"Is a college employee who was dismissed with sufficient
cause, but in violation of contractually guaranteed
termination procedures, entitled as a matter of contract
law to back pay for the period between the procedurally
defective dismissal and the subsequent proper dismissal?"
(636 P. 2d at 1067)

<

The Supreme Court held such an employee was entitled to back
pay as a matter of contract law.

The Court distinguished the

i

contract claim from the type of claim found in an action based upon
deprivation of constitutional rights, which sound in tort, and
which routinely do not allow for recovery of back wages where,
although due process if followed, good cause nevertheless exists
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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<

for the discharge.
"This outcome contrasts with the outcome produced by
analyzing the same problems from the standpoint of
breach of contract. By entering into an employment
contract of the type before us, the parties assume
continuing obligations to one another: the employee
to render services, the employer to pay salary. Those
obligations continue until they are extinguished. Here,
the termination mechanism described in the Personnel
Manual, which the district court found to govern the
terms of the contract between the college and its
employee, was the sole means by which the college could
extinguish the contractual relationship. Until it at
least substantially complied with those procedures, its
contractual obligation continued in force and the clock
continued to fun on Piacitelli's right to receive his
contract salary. Piacitelli is therefore entitled to
recover that accrued salary, and is not limited to
reimbursement for an injury caused by a specific wrongful
act.
This result comports with what we deem to be sound policy
for contractual employer-employee relations. It will
encourage employers to comply promptly with their contractual
termination procedures, and if they fail to do so will
impose the monetary consequences on the party at fault.
If the rule were otherwise, the employer could discharge
an employee summarily and then omit or delay the contractual
termination procedures with impunity so long as it was in
possession of evidence which, when ultimately provided,
would justify the discharge. In that circumstance, the
employee, without notice of the reason for his dismissal
and without any opportunity to refute the charges, would
remain in an indefinite and painful state of limbo, uncertain
about his ultimate right to reinstatement or back pay. If
our rule works any hardship on employers, they can avoid it
by prompt and substantial compliance with the procedures
to which they have agreed." (636 P. 2d at 1069, emphasis
supplied).
The direction of the court was clear:

to protect those

innocent employees who might be falsely accused of wrongdoing.

The

court, by following modern contract concepts, formulated a remedy
that gives the employment contract meaning not mere illusion, and
enforces that contract strictly, even to the point of requiring back
pay to an employee whose discharge was defective only as to process
-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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since good cause existed for the dismissal.
In the case at bar, the plaintiffs were discharged not for
improper performance, but because they were sacrificed as an
example to others.

The entire charade was based upon a ludricrous

witch hunt.
Utah is not alone in carving out exceptions to the terminableat-will doctrine.

In fact, more than two thirds of American

jurisdictions have abandoned the employment-at-will rule as a
strict substantive formulation.

See Perritt, Employment Dismissal

Law & Practice, 198 5 at page 18.
"In the past five years virtually every state court
has had to confront whether and how to curtail an
employer's reliance on the employment at will rule.
Employers had relied on the rule to discharge
employees in their absolute discretion except as
limited by statute or contract. Now, a majority
of jurisdictions to varying degrees have abrogated
employment at will by recognizing causes of action
for wrongful discharge . . . "
Springer, The Wrongful Discharge case, trial, June 1985 at page 38.
These inroads are a result of the inherent unfairness of the
traditional rule.

Increasingly, the courts have been willing to

recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge even where the
employment is of an indefinite duration or where the employee is
given no special consideration other than his services.

See cases

collected at 1 & 2 Employment-at-Will Reporter (May 198 3-January
1985).

- i
The employment-at-will is based on outdated assumptions and
leads to unnecessarily harsh results.
1816 (1980) .

See 93 Harvard Law Review

It is the employees who will bear the risk of malicious

I
and capricious firings by employers unless the courts imply a
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contractual term allowing only good faith discharges.

Such an

approach somewhat similar to what we see in protecting consumers
in product liability cases, will result in protecting employees
from the financial and emotional harm brought about by employer
abuse of discretion to terminate.
The reporters are replete with cases limiting and confining
the termination-at-will doctrine and I will only cite several of
the most significant.
In Larrabee v. Penobscot Frozen Foods, 486 A. 2d 97 (Me. 1984),
the plaintiff asserted an implied contract existed as a result of
writings entitled "General Policy" and "Word Rules".
discharged the plaintiff for "misconduct".

The defendant

The trial court dismissed

the cause of action on the basis that absent an allegation that the
employment was for a particular period of time, the employment was
terminable at will.
The Main Supreme Court in reversing the trial judge said:
"[5] While the employment of much of the country1s
labor force is governed by the terminable at will
rule, a subtantial percentage of the labor force is
protected by collective bargaining agreements or are
employed by federal or state governments, and can
generally be discharged only for 'just cause 1 . See
93 Harv. L. Rev. 1816, 1816 n. 1 & n. 2. There is
no reason why individuals not otherwise given this
protection and their employers should not be free
to contract against discharge without good cause,
as the plaintiffs in the instant case allege they
did. We hold, therefore, that parties may enter into
an employment contract terminable only pursuant to its
express terms—as 'for cause'— by clearly stating
their intention to do so, even though no consideration
other than services to be performed or promised is
expected by the employer, or is performed or promised
by the employee. In so holding, we join several other
courts which have carved out the identical or a similar
exception to the terminable-at-will rule."
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Toussaint v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 292 N.W.
2d 880 (Mich. 1980), an employee was discharged without good cause
under the employerfs policy manual which states that it was the
company's policy to require good cause for discharge and that the
employee had also been told that as long as he did his job well,
he would have a job with Blue Cross.

These representations the

court concluded gave the employee a legitimate expectation of job
security on which he could base a cause of action in contract
for discharge.

See also Weiner v. McGraw Hill, Inc., 443 N.E. 2d

441 (New York 1983).
In Forrester v« Parker, 606 P. 2d 191 (New Mexico 1980) the
plaintiff maintained that the personnel policy guide controlled the
employer-employee relationship.

The trial court held it did not

because plaintiff was an employee at will who could be discharged
even without cause.

The supreme court reversed holding that the

policy guide constituted an implied employment contract and the
conditions in it bound both the plaintiff and the defendant.
In Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Company, 638 P. 2d 1063
(Montana 1982), the employee entered into an employment contract
terminable at will.

Later the employer promulgated a handbook of

personnel policies establishing procedures with regard to termination.
The court ruled:
"If the employer has failed to follow its own policies,
the peace of mind of its employees is shattered and
an injustice is done.
4]We hold that a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
was implied in the employment contract of the appellant.
There remains a genuine issue of material fact which
precludes a summary judgment, i.e. whether the respondent
failed to afford appellant the process required and if
so, whether the respondent thereby breached the covenant
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of good faith and fair dealing."
In Southwest Gas Corporation v. Ahmad, 668 P. 2d 261 (Nevada
1983), Ahmad had an oral employment contract.

Subsequently, South-

west Gas issued Employee Information and Benefit Handbooks to its
employees.

The Supreme Court ruled that the handbook became part

of the original contract and thus termination had to comply with
the clause of the handbook relating thereto.
In Shah v. American Synthetic Rubber Corporation, 655

S. W.

2d 489 (Ky. 1983), Shah claimed a contract existed because of a
policies and procedure manual.

The defendant asserted that he was

an employee for an indefinite period of time thus rendering his
employment terminable at will.

In rejecting the employerfs claim

the court said:
"[2] Protection of employees against discharge without
cause is routinely provided under collective bargaining
agreements, as well as under civil service statutes
and ordinances. See cases and statutes collected in
93 Harv. L. Rev. 1816, 1816, n. 1 (1980). It is there
estimated that one-third of the entire national work force
is afforded such protection. Employers and individual
employees should be equally free to contract against
discharge without cause, as Shah and ASRC are presumed
for purposes of ASRC's motion for summary judgment to
have done. We joint a number of other jurisdictions
which hold that parties may enter into a contract of
employment terminable only pursuant to its express
terms—as 'for cause 1 —by clearly stating their intention to do so, even though no other considerations than
services to be performed or promised, is expected by the
employer, or performed or promised by the employee."
E.g. Littell v. evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F. 2d
36,37 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See also Rowe v. Noren Pattern
& Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W. 2d 713 (1979);
Drzewiecki v. H & R Block, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169, 24 Cal.
App. 3d 695 (1972) .
In Oslerkamp v. Atkota, Mfg. Inc., 332 N.W. 2d 275 (S.D.
198 3, the South Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the rules, regulations
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and disciplinary procedures of the employer-employee handbook
created a contractual right for which recovery could be had
for wrongful discharge.

A like decision was reached by the

Minnesota Supreme Court in Pine River State Bank v. Mettile,
333 N. W. 2d 622 (Minn. 1983):
"[4] If the handbook language constitutes an offer,
and the offer has been communicated by dissemination
of the handbook to the employee, the next question is
whether there has been an acceptance of the offer and
consideration furnished for its enforceability. In
the case of unilateral contracts for employment with
knowledge of new or changed conditions, the new or
changed conditions may become a contractual obligation.
In this manner, an original employment contract may be
modified or replaced by a subsequent unilateral contract.
The employee's retention of employment constitutes
acceptance of the offer of a unilateral contract? by
continuing to stay on the job, although free to leave,
the employee supplies the necessary consideration for
the offer."
In Vinyard v. King, 728 F. 2d 428 (10th Cir. 1984) the court
held that where the only writing evidencing an employment contract
was the employee handbook signed by both the employee and the
employer that under Oklahoma law a property interest existed that
was protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
In Wadeson v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company,
343 N. W. 2d 367 (N.D. 1984) the North Dakota Statute provided:
"34-03-01. Termination of Employment at will—Notice
Required. An employment having no specified term may
be terminated at the will of either party on notice
to the other, except when otherwise provided by this
title."
In spite of the statute the court recognized an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in all contracts and required an employer
to exercise good faith and fair dealing in terminating an employee.
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The Arizona Supreme Court has adopted the Personnel Policy
Manual exception to the termination-at-will doctrine in Wagenseller
v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 710 P. 2d 1025 (Arizona 1985)
and Accord Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hospital, 6 88 P. 2d
170 (Arizona 1984) .
In the case at hand, plaintiffs were required to sign the
Nordstrom History and Policy Regulations, Ex. P-l, T. 957-59, 1153,
1274-75.
Restatement, Second, Contracts Section 205 provides:
"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
its enforcement. "
This concept is likewise recognized in Williston Contracts
(3rd Edition §670, 1295):
"Whenever, therefore, a contract cannot be carried
out the way in which it was obviously expected
that it should be carried out, without one party or
the other performing some act not expressly promised
by him, a promise to do that act must be implied."
There is no compelling reason, public or otherwise to read out of an
employment contract an implied obligation of good faith and fair
dealing regardless of whether or not such contracts of employment
can be terminated at will.

To do so would remove the universal

obligation of good faith which Utah law has to this point traditionally read into and required in all contractual relationships, and
thus an implied contract existed and plaintiffs were entitled to rely
upon the procedures set forth therein and to require that the
defendant comply with the convenant of good faith and fair dealing
in any termination.
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B.

Utah Has Recognized an Implied Covenant of Good Faith
and Fair Dealing and the Courts Should Apply It in
Employment Contract Cases,
Utah has recognized that an implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing is inherent in every contract entered into
in this state.

Beck v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795,

(Utah 1985); Leigh Furniture and Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P. 2d
293 (Utah 1982); Prince v. Elm Company, Inc., 649 P. 2d 820 (Utah
1982) ; W. P. Harlin Construction Co.

v. Utah State Road Commission,

431 P. 2d 792 (Utah 1967).
In this case plaintiffs were merely asserting their rights
under Utah law with specific reference to the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing implied by the law in all contractual relationships.
Appellant in Point I B asserts that a majority of states have
rejected a bad faith exception to the at-will rule.

Such is not

the case and in fact a majority of states have embraced the good
faith and fair dealing concept as pointed out in the numerous
citations above.

Appellant asserts only public policy demands can

justify good faith and fair dealing requirements.

However, the

cases cited herein make it clear that it is a contractual obligation
to terminate only in good faith and with fair dealing.
Appellant also asserts that any change in the at-will rule
should be made by the legislature.

I am compelled to note at this

point that in Utah the at-will doctrine, as it exists, is a court
created doctrine and since the court possesses the legitimate
heritage of common law innovation that developes new principles
i

to accomodate changina values as discussed by Holms in the Common
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Law, and since the courts created the at-will rule, it is entirely
appropriate for the courts to modify or eliminate it.
There was ample and sufficient evidence to justify the
jury's verdict.

As pointed out in the statement of facts and

the citations to the record therein, defendants so-called investigation can best be characterized as one based on rumor, hearsay,
innuendo and suspicion.

The testimony of Betsey Sanders probably

characterizes the investigation best:
"If one person came to me it would be rumor. If s o m e —
if a couple of people came, that would certainly begin
to be enough evidence that we probably had something
definite, and if several people were telling the same
story could be enough to get people fired." T. 196 0
Appellant asserts that the issue of good faith and fair
dealing was never raised in the pleadings.

However, counsel cites

the amended complaints of the Knapps and Ms. Brehany in this brief,
page 33, wherein the plaintiffs allege that the defendant "breached
its duty of good faith in that plaintiffs were wrongfully discharged."
R. C82-5828, 108 and R. C82-5860, 4-5, 12.

In addition, plaintiffs1

trial memorandum filed on January 18, 1985 clearly established good
faith and fair dealing as a theory plaintiffs were relying upon.
The appellant is struggling to find reversible error.
The remaining issues raised in appellant's brief are without
merit and are not sustained by the state of the record and the
evidence presented in this case and should be summarily rejected.
POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN PARTIALLY DISMISSING
PLAINTIFFS' CLAIM OF BREACH OF CONTRACT AND THE SUPREME
COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND REMAND THIS CASE FOR FURTHER
TRIAL ON SUCH CLAIM.
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It is well settled that an implied covenant in a contract
is just as binding as one that is express.

See, for example, the

opinion of Justice Cardozo, in Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 2 22
N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917)

It is equally accepted that:

"Every contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and
its enforcement." (Restatement Second of Contracts
§231)
17 Am. Jur. 2d 653, Contracts §256 states:
"Every contract implies good faith and iair dealing
between the parties to it, and a duty of cooperation
on the part of both parties. Moreover, there is an
implied undertaking in every contract on the part of
each party that he will not intentionally and purposely do anything to prevent the other party from carrying out his part of the agreement, or do anything which
will have the effect of destroying or injuring the
right of the other party to receive the fruits of the
contract. Ordinarily if one exacts a promise from
another to perform an act, the law implies a counterpromise against arbitrary or unreasonable conduct on
the part of the promisee."
Numerous reported cases apply this rule to cases involving
employment contracts, including those involving so-called "atwill" employees.

See for example, Smithers v. MGM Studios, Inc.,

189 Cal. Rptr. 20 (1983), a formal written contract, with implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; Pugh v. See's Candies,
Inc./ 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981), a contract
of employment for indefinite duration, with implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and implied agreement that the employee
would be terminated only for good cause; Cancellier v. Federated
Department Stores, 672 F. 2d 1312 (9th Cir. 1982), applying
California law, finding an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in an employment contract; Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.
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2d 549 (N. H. 1974), employment at-will, terminated by employer
in bad faith, constitutes a breach of the employment contract;
and Fortune v. N . C R . Co. , 364 N.E. 2d 1251 (Mass. 1977) finding
an implied covenant of good faith in employment contract that
was terminable-at-will.
Numerous cases have found implied covenants do not discharge
an employee except for good cause.

See for example, Pugh v. See1s

Candies, Inc., supra,; Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal.
App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980), employment contract,
terminable-at-will has implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
and employer is estopped to discharge employee without good cause;
Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F. 2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1983)
applying law of Pennsylvania, finding employee's custom, practice
or policy can create contracual requirements of just cause, or
contractual procedures, which an employer must abide by to discharge
an employee; and Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Shield of Michigan,
supra.
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, supra, is typical
holding, inter alia, that:
"1)
;

a provision of an employment contract providing that
an employee shall not be discharged except for cause
is legally enforceable although the contract is not
for a definite term—the term is 'indefinite1, and

2)

such a provision may become part of the contract
either by express agreement, oral or written, or as
a result of an employee's legitimate expectations
grounded in an employer's policy statements.

4)

a jury could also find for a wrongfully discharged
employee based on legitimate expectations grounded
in his employer's written policy statements set forth
in the manual of personnel policies." (292 N.W. 2d at
885.
-21-
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While some cases have held that employment handbooks are not
a part of an employment contract, there is a large body of wellreasoned cases in accord with

Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue

Shield, supra, including Conley v. Board of Trustees, 707 F. 2d
175 (5th Cir. 1983), Mississippi law, employerfs guidebook containing
rules adopted pursuant to expressly granted authority from the
legislature, created a constitutionally protected claim to continued
employment; Greene v. Howard University, 412 F. 2d 1128 (D. C.
Cir. 1969), faculty handbook created contractual obligation, notwithstanding purported disclaimer; Forrester v. Parker, supra,
personnel policy guide constituted implied employment contract arising
as a result of parties conduct; Yartzoff v. Democrat-Herald Publishing Co., 281 Ore. 651, 576 P. 2d 356 (1978), no summary judgment
where issue of fact existed as to whether provisions in employee
handbook were intended to be part of original contract for employment
and that contract allowed termination only for good cause; Walker
v. Northern San Diego County Hospital District, 135 Cal. App. 3d
896, 185 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982), error to direct verdict for employer
where issues existed as to whether employee had a written or oral
i

or implied in fact agreement that she would be terminated only for
cause; Southwest Gas Corporation v. Ahmad, supra, holding that parties
were contractually bound by termination clause in employee handbook;
(

and Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., supra.
In Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., supra, an employee sued for
wrongful termination.
by the trial court.

The employer's motion to dismiss was denied
The employer appealed to the appellate division,
-22-
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which reversed.

Appeal was then taken to the Court of Appeals,

which reinstated the trial court's ruling.
The court of appeals in Weiner noted that although the
plaintiff's employment was for an indefinite term of duration,
he still could state a cause of action for breach of contract on
the ground that he was discharged without "just and sufficient
cause", or the rehabilitative efforts specified in the employer's
personnel handbook.

The court stated:

"Turning now to substance, it is also clear that
the fact that plaintiff was free to quit his employment at will, standing by itself, was not entitled
to conclusory effect. Such a position proceeds on
the oversimplified premise that, since the plaintiff
was not bound to stay on, the agreement for his
employment lacked 'mutuality1, thus leaving the
defendant free to terminate at its pleasure. But
this would lead to the not uncommon analytical
error of engaging in a search for 'mutuality1, which
is not always essential to a binding contract, rather
than of seeking to determine the presence of consideration, which is a fundamental requisite. For, while
co-extensive promise may constitute consideration for
each other, 'mutuality' in the sense of requiring
such reciprocity, is not necessary when a promisor
receives other valid consideration." (44 3 N.E. 2d at
p. 444, citations omitted)
The court continued:
"As to consideration, any basic contemporary definition
would include the idea that it consists of either a
benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee.
As elaborated in Hamer v. Sidway, the seminal case on the
subject, '[i]t is enough that something is promised, done,
forborne or suffered by the party to whom the promise is
made as consideration for the promise made to him' (citation
omitted)
Far from consideration needing to be coextensive or
even proportionate, the value or measurability of the
thing forborne or promised is not crucial so long as
it is acceptable to the promisee. Thus, courts have
not hesitated to find sufficient consideration not only
in what is now the proverbial peppercorn but in 'a horse
or a canary, or a tomtit if [the promisee] chose'. In
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fact, the detriment suffered or the thing promised
need be of no benefit to the one who agreed to it.
So, in Hamer what the plaintiff 'suffered1 was
self-denial of liquor and tobacco, a sacrifice which
prompted our court, quoting from Anson's Principles
of Contracts (at page 6 3), to explain that it would
'not ask whether the thing which forms the consideration does in fact benefit the promisee or a third
party, or is of any substantial value to anyone,'
(citations omitted)
Apt too in the circumstances before as now is the
following comment by Corbin: [I]f the employer
made a promise, either express or implied, not only
to pay for the service but also that the employment
should continue for a period of time that is either
definite or capable of being determined, that employment is not terminable by him 'at will' after the
employee has begun or rendered some of the requested
service or has given any other consideration... this
is true even though the employee has made no return
promise and has retained the power and legal privilege
of termination of the employment 'at will'. The
employer's promise is supported by the service that
has been begun or rendered or by the other executed
consideration. (1A Corbi, Contracts, Section 152, page
14). So understood, an agreement on the part of an
employer not to dismiss an employee except for 'good
and sufficient cause only' and, if such cause was
given, until the prescribed procedures to rehabilitate
had failed, does not create an ineluctable employment
at will." (443 N.E. 2d at 444-445)
The court of appeals found the facts of the case presented
a question for trial as to whether or not the employer was bound to
a contract to not discharge its employer without just and sufficient
cause, and an opportunity for rehabilitation.
Finally, the court noted that Martin v. N.Y. Life Insurance
Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895) . . .
" . . . itself, when, in 1895, it adopted New York's
at-will rule, afforded it no greater status than that
of a rebuttable presumption (citations omitted)[if no
definite term is fixed by contract, a hiring at will is
deemed to have resulted only 'in the absence of circumstances showing a different intention']. In determining
whether such a presumption is overcome here the trier of
the facts will have to consider the 'course of conduct'
of the parties, 'including their writings' (citations
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omitted) and their antecedent negotiations. Moreover, as Brown suggests it is not McGraw's subjective
intent, nor 'any single act, phrase or other expression'
but the 'totality of all of these, given the attendant
circumstances, the situation of the parties, and the
objectives they were striving to attain', which will
control." (443 P. 2d at p. 446, citations omitted)
The fact that Nordstrom offered a profit sharing plan,.
See Ex P-l, is still more evidence of an implied covenant to not
discharge except for good cause, in good faith.

By holding out this

plan, in their employee handbook as "One of the Most Important
Benefits Nordstrom Has For Its Employees" (original emphasis),
and setting up the plan so that the benefits are "divided proportionately among the employees according to their earnings and their years
in the plan" (emphasis added), Nordstrom could only have intended
to convey to its employees that their employment was secure, so long
as they performed their jobs well.
Indeed, the pamphlet states, in the Profit Sharing Section
(page 19):
" . . . the more efficiently you work and the less time
you waste, the greater the company's profits and the
greater your share becomes. . ."
To allow dismissal without cause or good faith would render
the Profit Sharing Plan an illusion and a nullity.

See Cain v.

Allen Electric & Equipment Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78 N.W. 2d 296
(1956); Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich. 318, 264 N.W.
385 (1936); Gaydos v. White Motor Corp., 54 Mich. App. 143, 220
N.W. 2d 697 (1974); Clarke v. Brunswick Corp., 48 Mich. App. 667,
211 N.W. 2d 101 (1973); Couch v. Administrative Committee of the
Diffco Laboratories, Inc., Salaried Employees Profit Sharing
Trust, 44, 205 N.W. 2d 24 (1972); and Haney v. Lamb, 312 A. 2d
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330 (Del. 1973).
All of the foregoing is consistent with the theory of
contracts expressed in Corbin on Contracts, One Volume Edition,
§18.
"§18.

Express and Implied Contracts.

,

Contractual duty is imposed by reason of a
promissory expression. As to this, there is no
difference between an express contract and an
implied contract; all contracts are express contracts.
But there are different modes of expressing assent.
Expression may be by the tongue, the eye, the hand,
or by all of them at once. It may be by language,
by words written or spoken. Yet there is also "sign
language" which may consist of signs that are mere
translations from a language of words, or of signs
that convey ideas independently of any word language.
A contract made by sign language is an express contract.
The language used to express assent, whether of
words or other other signs and symbols, may be one
invented by the parties themselves for their own private
communications, or indeed for one communication only.
They may use code words instead of English words, their
own code, or the Morse code or the Western Union telegraphic code. They may twist ordinary English words
into code words, so that man signifies dog and tree
signifies a thousand bushels of wheat. A contract made
by a code communication is an express contract. Throwing up one's hat is usually an expression of joy; but
it may be made to express assent to an agreement to sell
land for ten thousand dollars.
From the above, it appears also that all contracts
are implied contracts; for the meaning to be given to any
and all of these modes of expression is found by a process
of implication and inference. There are implications in
English words as well as in other signs and symbols; and
what your words imply is also what your words express.
Assent may be expressed by acts that have no antecedent
agreed meaning, although no meaning can be attributed to
them except in relation to the previous usage and conduct
of men. The inference to be drawn from the acts is
determined by what the actor and other men have used them
to express.
The distinction between an express and an implied
contract, therefore, is of little importance, if it can be
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said to exist at all. The matter that is of importance , is the degree of effectiveness of the expression
used. Clarity of expression determines the reasonableness of understanding and eases the court's problems
in case of dispute. The character of the evidence to
be presented to the court depends upon the mode of
expression used: and the more variant and obscure the
mode, the more difficult the court's problem. No
where is accomplished artistry worth more than in the
drafting of an important contract. It may be an
exaggeration to say that nowhere is it less often to
be found. Where an expression of agreement is put into
words that are frequently used with more than one
meaning, it is difficult, and sometimes impossible
to decide that an express contract exists. Likewise,
when conduct other than words is such as persons
frequently perform with different meanings, it is
difficult, and sometime impossible, to decide that an
implied contract exists.
It is now well understood that a contract may be
unilateral; that is, that only one of the parties makes
a promise, the consideration for which is sortie nonpromissory performance rendered by the other or for
which no consideration is necessary. In such cases, it
is nearly always the promisor who makes an offer of his
promise and requests action or forbearance in return.
If such is the offer that has been made a promise that
he will render the requested performance. Generally,
therefore, the implication of a return promise is
directly bound up with the interpretation of the terms
of the offer. If the offeror has not asked for a promise,
the normal result is that he doesnft get one; but if the
offeror does ask for a promise and the conduct of the
offeree makes him believe reasonably that the requested
promise has been made, the court will generally find that
it has been made, by implication if not expressly. This
will be true, whether the plaintiff is trying to prove
that the defendant made such an implied promise in order
to maintain action for its enforcement, or whether the
plaintiff is trying to show that he himself made such an
implied promise in order to establish a consideration for the
express promise of the defendant.
Parties who have made an express contract to be in
effect for one year (or any other stated time) frequently
proceed with performance after expiration of the year
without making any new express agreement, of extension or
otherwise. From such continued action a court may infer
that the parties have agreed in fact to renew the one-year
contract for another similar period. Illustrations can be
found in leaseholds, employment transactions, and contract
for a continuing supply of some commodity." (citation ommitted).
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Applying the Corbin reasoning to the totality of facts and
circumstances in the case at bar, it is clear that an employment
contract existed between plaintiffs and Nordstrom, and, as a part
of that contract, there existed a covenant that plaintiffs would be
secure in their positions, and subject to discharge only for good
cause, and in good faith.

This covenant was grossly breached by

Nordstrom.

v

Plaintiffs herewith incorporate the argument and cases cited
in Point I, supra.

Finally, the facts of the instant case, and

the statements and acts of Nordstrom, amount to circumstances which
any reasonable, objective person seeking employment, or one already
employed, would construe as a promise of job security, and a promise
that one would not be dismissed except for cause and in good faith.
Nordstrom must certainly have reasonably expected that its
statements and acts would lead employees and potential employees
to believe they were promised job security; indeed they must have
intended such a construction, and further intended that such a
construction (i.e. job security, no dismissal without case, in
good faith) would induce employees to work for their corporation.
Under such circumstances as here, when injustice can only be
avoided by the enforcement of the promise, the principles behind the
doctrine of promissory estoppel mandate that the promise be enforced.
See Restatements of Contracts, Second, §90.
POINT III
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS1 CLAIM
OF DEFAMATION AND THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD REVERSE AND
REMAND THIS CASE FOR FURTHER TRIAL ON SUCH CLAIM.
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The facts herein present for the court a straight-forward
defamation case.

Defendant, through its agents, made defamatory

statements in the nature of accusations of criminal conduct that
resulted in plaintiffs being injured..

T. 1140, 133, 1337-38,

1358, 1360, 1367, 1372-77, 1392, 1399, 1403-1407.

Defendants argued

and the court in dismissing plaintiffs' claim adopted the defense
of qualified privilege.
While such doctrine is recognized in Utah, Combs v.. Montgomery
Ward and Co., 288 P. 2d 272 (1951); Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc.,
551 P. 2d 222 (1976); Lind v. Lynch, 665 P. 2d 1276 (1983), no
cases exist which deal specifically with the facts presented by
this case, that is the accusation of a crime involving drugs or
narcotics.
Professor Prosser in Handbook on the Law of Torts, 4th Ed.
1971 succinctly discusses the law of qualified privilege.

On page

785 he sets forth six (6) categories of interest protected by a
qualified privilege.
"1.

Interest of Publisher. Roughly similar to the
privileges of self-defense or the defense of
property is the privilege which attaches to
the publication of defamatory matter for the
protection or advancement of the defendant's
own legitimate interests. Thus, he may publish
in an appropriate manner, anything which reasonably appears to be necessary to defend his own
reputation against the defamation of another,
including, of course, the allegation that his
accuser is an unmitigated liar and the truth is
not in him."

"2.

Interest of Others. The privilege to use force
to protect the safety of another finds a general
parallel in the privilege to publish defamation
for the protection of the interests of persons
other than the publisher . . .
As in the case
of the use of force, the defendant must have
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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reason to believe that the publication is necessary
:f, for the purpose, and that the other is unable to
protect himself."
"3. Common Interest. A conditional privilege is recognized in many cases where the publisher and the
recipient have a common interest, and the communication is of a kind reasonably calculated to protect
or further it. . . . This is most obvious, of course,
in the case of those who have entered upon or are
considering business dealings with one another, or
where the parties are members of a group with a common
pecuniary interest, as where officers, agents or
employees of a business organization communicate
with stockholders, or with other employees or branch
offices about the affairs of the organization itself,
or taxpayers discuss the management of public funds,
or an association of property owners the desirability
of a prospective purchaser, or creditors the affairs
of a common debtor. . . . The privilege has also been
extended to the members of groups with a common interest
of a non-pecuniary character, such as religious or
professional societies, fraternal, social or educational organizations, families or labor unions, if the
matter communicated is pertinent to the interest of the
group. In all such cases, however, the privilege is
lost, if the defamation goes beyond the group interest,
or if the publication is made to persons who have no
reason to receive the information."
"4. Communication to One Who May Act in the Public Interest.
The interest of the general public as distinguished
from that of any individual has given rise to two
qualified privileges, which often has been confused.
. . . The first sometimes called the 'public interest1
privilege, involves communications made to those who
may be expected to take official action of some kind
for the protection of some interest of the public. It is on this basis that communications from one public
officer to another in an effort to discharge official
duty are held to be at least qualifiedly privileged.
. . . But private citizens likewise are privileged to
give information to proper authorities for the prevention or detection of crime, or to complain to them
about the conduct of public officials and seek their
removal from office."
"5. Fair Comment on Matters of Public Concern."
"6. Reports of Public Proceedings."
Professor Prosser after recognizing and describing the
categories of Qualified Privilege points out that such conditional
Digitized
Howardto
W. Hunter
Library, J. Reuben Clark
Law School,
privilege may
beby the
lost
theLawpublisher
when
he BYU.
abuses the privilege.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

"Abuse of Qualified Privilege. The condition
attached to all such qualified privileges is
that they must be exercised in a reasonable
manner and for a proper purpose. The immunity
is forfeited if the defendant steps outside
of the scope of the privilege, or abuses the
occasion. Thus qualified privilege does not
extend, in any of the above cases, to the publication of irrelevant defamatory matter with no
bearing upon the public or private interest which
is entitled to protection; nor does it include
publication to any person other than those whose
hearing of it is reasonably believed to be
necessary or useful for the futherance of that
interest. ... Furthermore, the qualified privilege
will be lost if the defendant publishes the
defamation in the wrong state of mind. The word
'malice', which has plagued the law of defamation
from the beginning, has been much used in this
connection, and it frequently is said that the
privilege is forfeited if the publication is
!
malicious f . ... Perhaps the statement which best
fits the decided cases is that the court will
look to the primary motive or purpose by which the
defendant apparently is inspired. Discarding 'malice'
as a meaningless and quite unsatisfactory term,
it appears that the privilege is lost if the publication is not made primarily for the purpose of
furthering the interest which is entitled to protection." ... Finally, since there is not social
advantage in the publication of a deliberate lie,
the privilege is lost if the defendant does not
believe what he says. Many courts have gone
further, and have said that it is lost if the
defamer does not have reasonable grounds, or
'probable cause' to believe it to be true. ...
Probably the best statement of the rule is that
the defendant is required to act as a reasonable
man under the circumstances, with due regard to
the strength of his belief, the grounds that he
has to support it, and the importance of conveying
the information."
With respect to burden of proof Professor Prosser
says:
"Burden of Proof-Court and Jury. The burden is
upon the defendant in the first instance to establish
existence of a privileged occasion for the publication,
by proof of a recognized public or private interest
which would justify the utterance of the words.
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Whether the occasion was a privileged one, is
a question to be determined by the court as
an issue of law, unless of course the facts
are in dispute, in which case the jury will be
instructed as to the proper rules to apply. Once
the existence of the privilege is established,
the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove that it
has been abused by excessive publication, by use
of the occasion for an improper purpose, or by
lack of belief or grounds for belief in the
truth of what is said."
Two Utah cases cited previously as recognizing the doctrine
of conditional privilege must each be viewed from their oarticular
factual settings. Combs

v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, involved

an agent of defendant interviewing fellow employees about missing
money and plaintiff f s reputation for honesty.

After the interviews

and at the end of the day, plaintiff was terminated.
alleging defamation.

At trial the court directed a verdict for

the defendant on the grounds that:
privileged and

(2)

Ke sued

(1)

the statements were

that there was no evidence of actual malice

so as to remove tne privilege.

The Supreme Court affirmed the

findings of conditional privilege citing the law of torts, Sec.
594, p. 242:
"An occasion is conditionally privileged when
the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that:
(a) facts exist which affect a sufficiently
important interest of the publisher, and
(b) the r e c i p i e n t s knowledge of the
defamatory matter will be of service in the
lawful protection of the interest."
The court further stated:

!

"... any communication between employer and
employee is protected by this privilege,
provided it is made bona fide about something
in which (1) the speaker or writer has an
interest or duty; (2) the hearer or person •
addressed has a corresponding interest or
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duty; and provided (3) the statement is made
in protection of that interest or in the performance of that duty. There must also be an
honest belief in the truth of the statement."
The court went on to discuss the limited category of person
with whom proper inquiry, under a conditional privilege
might be made:
"As indicated in the foregoing quotation, for
the purpose of safeguarding against too widespread, careless or ill-advised inquiry under
the protection of the cloak of conditional
privilege, the law reuqires that there also be
a proper interest on the part of the one to
whom the inquiry is made. This subject is covered under the comments of (g) and (h) on clause
(b) of the Rule 594 from the Restatement of
Torts referred to above:
(g) Under the rule stated ... it is further
necessary that the publication be made to a
person, who if the defamatory matter be true,
may reasonably be expected to be of service
in the protection of the interest.
(h) . . . an owner of property may communicate
his reasonable belief that it is in danger of
theft or harm to his employee or a police officer
since such persons have a legal duty to assist
him in the protection of his property interests."
The court concluded from the facts shown that inquiry of the
fellow employees was necessary to determine what had become
of the money since each fellow employee had access to it. "
The court further concluded that the employees either had or
should have had an interest in protecting employers property
thus finding a commonality of interest which would sustain a
conditional privilege.

This case may be described by Professor

Prosser as a case falling within category three, Common Interest.
Ogden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc., supra dealt with
an editorial wherein the defendant KSL reported that the
plaintiff had been charged with driving on a revoked license.
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The court adopted the conditional privilege rule as follows:
"It is firmly established that matters of
public interest and concern are legitimate
subjects of fair comment and criticism, not
only in newspapers and in radio and television
broadcasts, but by members of the public
generally, and such comments and criticisms
are not actionable, however severe in their
terms, unless they are made maliciously..."
This case falls within Professor Prossers category four.
Lind v. Lynch was a case where stockholders in
a corporation mailed to other stockholders in the corporation
copies of a complaint filed against the plaintiff in a federal
court.

The court in affirming summary judgment said:
"It has long been held that communications
between persons who share a common business
interest are qualifiedly privileged and not
libelous in the absence of malice."

This case falls within Professor Prosser's category three.
In looking at the facts presented by the case here
before the court we must ask which of the categories of Qualified
Privilege can this case be araued to fall within.

It can only

be argued to fall within category three, Common Interest.
What common interest, if any, can there be said to exist between
the defendants in this case and their employees so far as the statemen
that plaintiffs are involved in drugs or narcotics is concerned?
Obviously, there is no common interest.

The only interest served

by the publication of the statements was self interests of the
defendants.

<

A case almost identical on its facts to this case

is Haddad v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 526 F. 2d 83 (6th Circuit 1976).
In that case plaintiff was accused of gambling and allowing
others to gamble on company property and of falsifying company
records.

After his firing, employees who had been supervised
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by plaintiff asked for a meeting with the store manager.
The manager told the employees that the plaintiff has been
discharged for gambling and allowing gambling and for
falsification of company records.
for $37,000 for plaintiff.

The jury returned a verdict

On aopeal it was asserted the trial

court erred by not finding the statements to fall within a
qualified privilege.

The court in denying a qualified privilege

cited two previous Michigan cases, Bostetter v. Kirsch Co.,
319 Mich. 547, 30 N.W. 2d 276 (1948) and Sais v. General Motors,
372 Mich. 542, 127 N. W. 2d 357 (1964) as follows:
"Qualified privilege exists in a much larger
number of cases. It extends to all communications
made bona fide upon any subject matter in which
the party communicating has an interest, or in
reference to which he has a duty, to a person having
a corresponding interest or duty. And the privilege
embraces cases where the duty is not a legal one,
but where it is of a moral or social character of
imperfect obligation."
"On the question of the publication of the
statement we hold that in calling in fellow
employees of plaintiff and Explaining 1 the
circumstances of his separation, defendant
corporation was serving its own particular
interest. That interest, as described by
defendant's representatives was to restore
morale in the plant protection force and
to quiet rumors that were circulating among
its members, adversely affecting the company."
"The question of application of qualified
privilege in a situation like this involving
communications to fellow employees (particularly
where the plaintiff has been a supervisor and
his former subordinates Have sought information
about his discharge) is not an easy one."
It is submitted that the facts of Haddad v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., supra, are on all fours with the facts before
this court.
-35Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The allegations here are drugs, in that gambling.

The communi-

cation in both cases was to employees of one in a supervisory
capacity.

No common interest exists such as the protection

of company money as was seen in Comb s v. Montgomery Ward &
Co., supra.

No common interest exists such as among stockholders

as was seen in Lind v. Lynch, supra.

The publication herein

tended to serve only the particular interests of the defendants
and none other.
As a result the Qualified Privilege cannot be said
to exist.

See Drennen v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation,

328 Southern 2d 52 (1976).
Even if a Qualified Privilege were found to have
existed it must be deemed to have been lost because of abuse
as previously discussed by Professor Prosser, see abuse of
Qualified Privilege supra.
In Dillard Department Stores v. Felton, 6 34 S. W.
2d 135 (1982) a Dillard security guard observed a box of
merchandise in Felton1s car.

Felton was called to the office

of the supervisor and there he was accused of being a thief
and a liar.

Felton walked out of the meeting.

He told a

fellow employee that he had been accused of taking some things.
When the supervisor came out of the office the fellow employee asked
.*what had happened and the supervisor said Felton had been
fired because he had been caught stealing. The :jury awarded
damages arid the company appealed arguing that they had not
exceeded the qualified privilege existing under the law.

In

discussing this issue the court cited the Restatement (Second)
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of Torts §595

(1981)).

"(1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally
privileged if the circumstances induce a correct
or reasonble belief that
(a) there is information that affects a
sufficiently important interest of the
recipient or a third person and,
(b) the recipient is one to whom the
publisher is under a legal duty to publish
the defamatory matter or is a person to whom
its publication is otherwise within the
generally accepted standards of decent conduct.
(2) In determining whether a publication is within
the generally accented standards of decent conduct
it is an important factor that
(a) The publication is made in response to
a request rather than volunteered by the publisher
or
(b) a family or other relationship exists
between the parties."
In affirming the award of the jury the court went on to say:
"One important condition attaches to the qualified
privilege, such communications must be exercised in
a reasonable manner and for a proper purpose. The
immunity does not protect a defendant from publication
to persons other than those whose hearing is reasonably believed to be necessary or useful for the
furtherance of that interest."
The court found that the communication to Felton by the supervisor
in his office was protected as a qualified privilege but further
found that the statement to fellow employees that Felton had been
fired because he was caught stealing exceeded the privilege
afforded by law.
"Since we find no legitimate interest necessitating
Martin's statement and find it to have been factually
inaccurate at the expense of appellee's reputation,
we think it excessive and therefore supportive of
the award of compensatory damages."
"The protection of the privilege may be lost by
the manner of its exercise, although the belief
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in the truth of the charge exists. The privilege
does not protect any unnecessary defamation. In
order for a communication to be privileged, the
party making it must be careful to go no farther
than his interest or his duties require. Where the
party exceeds his privilege and the communication
complained of goes beyond what the occasion demands
that he should publish, and is unnecessarily defamatory
of plaintiff, he will not be protected, and the fact
that a duty, a common interest or a confidential
relation existed to a limited degree is not a defense,
even though he acted in good faith."
The findings of this case are applicable in the case
before this court.

There was no legitimate interest necessitating

the statement of defendants that plaintiffs were terminated for
involvement in drugs or narcotics.

The defendants exceeded any

privilege which may have existed and they published unnecessarily
defamatory statements and by doing so lost that privilege.

Had the

defendants stated that plaintiffs were under investigation for
drugs they would have been on safer ground but such is not the
case and the privilege, if any, must be deemed waived.
Should the court by chance find that a qualified
privilege exists there is sufficient evidence of actual malice

(

to permit this case to be decided by the jury.
Two Utah cases have dealt with the malice that must be
shown to overcome a conditional privilege.

Ogden Bus Lines,

<

supra at page 225 provides:
"The malice which plaintiff must show in order
to overcome a conditional privilege is simply
,. an improper motive such as a desire to do
harm or that the defendant did not honestly
believe his statements to be true or that the
publication was excessive."
"The question of whether a qualifiedly
privileged article is written or published
with malicious motive or otherwise is generally
speaking, a question of fact to be determined
by the jury."
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See also Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P. 968 (1981) at
page 975.
The United States Supreme Court has also spoken on the
issue of what must be shown to overcome a qualified privilege
and have stated that publications subject to a qualified privilege
are actionable only upon a showing that they were made with knowledge
that they were false or with reckless disregard of whether they were
false or not.

New York Times v. Sullivat, 376 U.S. 254 at p. 280,

84 S. Ct. 710 at p. 726, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this court should affirm the
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant;
the court should deny a remittitur and deny the granting of a new
trial.

The court should reverse and remand for trial that portion

of the District Court's judgment partially dismissing plaintiffs'
claim for breach of contract and should likewise reverse and
remand for trial that portion of the District Court's judgment
dismissing plaintiffs' claims for defamation.
DATED this 5th day of May, 1986.

/s/
/
/

D^/GILBERT ATHAY
Lawyer for Respondents-Cross
Appellants
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